A merging question…

“…the process could evaporate off their technical staff…”

Is it healthy for us to absorb one of our collaborators/competitors as a simple donor to our projects/partners?

On the one hand:

· it could reduce our cumulative bureaucratic load,

· it is a positive sign in an all-too-often cynical and fragmentary world,

· it could allow them to focus on core skills of fund-raising and us on programme delivery.

On the other hand:

· we have lower field supervision expectations than they presently do; can they accept this as ‘progress’ or will they want us to increase our supervisory intensity?

· will they maintain their technical inputs to projects they support as supernumerary to our overheads, or will they attempt to subtract them from our overheads – in effect removing our leeway to manage as we see fit; who will end up controlling whom?

· the process could evaporate off their technical staff; and if this happens, will we have won or lost?

· will the process also drive away their own current partners, unwilling to partner us now, or unhappy at not having been consulted?

The project 'market' caricature

“Our opaque transactions increase costs by requiring Orwellian
'double think'.”

Our agency agrees to implement and not raise funds. Our funding arms agree not to implement nor to fund others. Our funders don't compete but after expressing their preferences they are simply given projects - supposedly on transparently rational grounds.

To our funders, project cost supposedly has little meaning and is anyway approved in advance by our agency. Nor are the projects officially involved in the funder choices. It is tacitly assumed that the relative value (factoring in both technical quality and the ability to raise funds from direct donors) of our projects is equal (value is related to a fixed overhead portion coming to our agency).

In reality, I perceive that projects are being 'bought' and 'sold'; the price of quality and resale potential is the Relational Intricacy (combining the degree of interference granted to the funders – their 'added value', and the amount of documentation and communication required).

Simplistically speaking:
· Agents with a well funded portfolio squeeze funders to keep documentation and communication (a cynic might quip “and accountability”) minimal.
· Funders counter with humble passivity, agents blaming the victims for non-assertive relationships.
· In opposite circumstances, funders play 'accountability' and 'added value' cards to their maximum, taking control of important areas of project decision making.
· Agents respond by courting alternate internal funders in opaque deals.

What if we had some competition between projects to secure funders and between funders to fund projects?
· Should funders bid overhead percentage offers?
· Should unchosen projects be refused access to agency reserves?
· Will projects compete for 'easy' funds?
· Will funders re-direct funds outside our agency?
· Could our agency compete with internal funders to raise funds directly?

Our opaque transactions increase costs by requiring Orwellian 'double think'. But an unspoken fear exists, that allowing more transparent competition might not improve everyone's practice, but instead cause our fragmentation. I don't know what to prefer.