“Our opaque transactions increase costs by requiring Orwellian
'double think'.”
Our agency agrees to implement and not raise funds. Our funding arms agree not to implement nor to fund others. Our funders don't compete but after expressing their preferences they are simply given projects - supposedly on transparently rational grounds.
To our funders, project cost supposedly has little meaning and is anyway approved in advance by our agency. Nor are the projects officially involved in the funder choices. It is tacitly assumed that the relative value (factoring in both technical quality and the ability to raise funds from direct donors) of our projects is equal (value is related to a fixed overhead portion coming to our agency).
In reality, I perceive that projects are being 'bought' and 'sold'; the price of quality and resale potential is the Relational Intricacy (combining the degree of interference granted to the funders – their 'added value', and the amount of documentation and communication required).
Simplistically speaking:
· Agents with a well funded portfolio squeeze funders to keep documentation and communication (a cynic might quip “and accountability”) minimal.
· Funders counter with humble passivity, agents blaming the victims for non-assertive relationships.
· In opposite circumstances, funders play 'accountability' and 'added value' cards to their maximum, taking control of important areas of project decision making.
· Agents respond by courting alternate internal funders in opaque deals.
What if we had some competition between projects to secure funders and between funders to fund projects?
· Should funders bid overhead percentage offers?
· Should unchosen projects be refused access to agency reserves?
· Will projects compete for 'easy' funds?
· Will funders re-direct funds outside our agency?
· Could our agency compete with internal funders to raise funds directly?
Our opaque transactions increase costs by requiring Orwellian 'double think'. But an unspoken fear exists, that allowing more transparent competition might not improve everyone's practice, but instead cause our fragmentation. I don't know what to prefer.
To our funders, project cost supposedly has little meaning and is anyway approved in advance by our agency. Nor are the projects officially involved in the funder choices. It is tacitly assumed that the relative value (factoring in both technical quality and the ability to raise funds from direct donors) of our projects is equal (value is related to a fixed overhead portion coming to our agency).
In reality, I perceive that projects are being 'bought' and 'sold'; the price of quality and resale potential is the Relational Intricacy (combining the degree of interference granted to the funders – their 'added value', and the amount of documentation and communication required).
Simplistically speaking:
· Agents with a well funded portfolio squeeze funders to keep documentation and communication (a cynic might quip “and accountability”) minimal.
· Funders counter with humble passivity, agents blaming the victims for non-assertive relationships.
· In opposite circumstances, funders play 'accountability' and 'added value' cards to their maximum, taking control of important areas of project decision making.
· Agents respond by courting alternate internal funders in opaque deals.
What if we had some competition between projects to secure funders and between funders to fund projects?
· Should funders bid overhead percentage offers?
· Should unchosen projects be refused access to agency reserves?
· Will projects compete for 'easy' funds?
· Will funders re-direct funds outside our agency?
· Could our agency compete with internal funders to raise funds directly?
Our opaque transactions increase costs by requiring Orwellian 'double think'. But an unspoken fear exists, that allowing more transparent competition might not improve everyone's practice, but instead cause our fragmentation. I don't know what to prefer.
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